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Organising the political coordination of  
knowledge and innovation policies 
Dietmar Braun 
This special issue of Science and Public Policy takes up the recently discussed problem of political 
coordination in the ‘third phase of innovation’. The introduction prepares the analytical ground for the 
four case studies that follow. It develops the image of a ‘knowledge space’ consisting of the four ‘core’ 
areas of innovation policy — higher education, professional education, basic research and 
technological research — and uses insights from administrative science and a number of science and 
policy studies that discuss the need for coordination in policy-making in knowledge and innovation 
systems. Different types of coordination are distinguished as well as various institutional levels within 
the political system that play a role in the overall capacity of improving political coordination. A 
number of problems and expectations are raised which are the starting point of reflections in the 
ensuing case studies. 
NNOVATION POLICY HAS ENTERED its 
third phase (OECD 2005a,b,c). While the first 
phase was characterised by a ‘linear’ view of in-
novation as an automatic spill-over process between 
basic knowledge and technological application, in 
the second phase non-linear and recursive interac-
tions between a variety of actors participating in the 
quest for innovation were highlighted. With the  
‘national systems of innovation’ approach, a sys-
temic view of the innovation process became  
increasingly accepted (Lundvall, 1992; Edquist, 
1997b). Innovation policies during this phase re-
mained, however, sector-based and focused on the 
content of policies (OECD, 2005a). It is only in the 
third phase that innovation has come to be seen as 
the interplay of market and non-market forces and as 
denoting a policy of ‘structuration’, of framework-
setting that helps to correct ‘market failures’ and 
improve interactions between the different compo-
nents of the ‘innovation system’. These claims were 
clearly expressed for the first time by the Organisa-
tion for Economic Development and Cooperation 
(OECD) in 1999. The ‘new role for government’, 
the OECD writes, is to ‘secure framework condi-
tions, remove barriers to innovation, enhancing 
technology diffusion, promoting networking and 
clustering and leveraging research and development’ 
(OECD, 1999: 10). 
Such ‘systems management’ needs 
comprehensive and coherent policies that are 
characterised by a good match between indi-
vidual instruments and objectives as well as by 
compatible instruments and objectives in  
different policy areas. (OECD, 1999: 71) 
The problem is, however, that OECD countries sel-
dom seem able to develop an ‘encompassing,  
systemic-oriented innovation policy’ that can  
‘accommodate the dynamism’ occurring on the level 
of research and technology development. 
An investigation into the political conditions 
needed to realise such an encompassing innovation 
policy has been neglected until now in the literature 
on innovation and is the thrust of this special issue of 
Science and Public Policy. The focus of the ‘national 
systems of innovation’ approach (Lundvall, 1992; 
Edquist, 1997b) has been on the firm; the ‘triple helix’ 
approach (Leydesdorff, 2000) analyses primarily uni-
versities. This does not mean that these two ap-
proaches would not recognise the importance of 
politics and policies. Quite the contrary: the ‘national 
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system of innovations’ approach, in accordance with 
‘evolutionary economics’, has overcome the typical 
neo-classical economic view of (political) institu-
tions as retarding and disturbing factors in (market) 
innovation.  
The ‘triple helix’ approach acknowledges interde-
pendence between industry, universities, and the po-
litical sphere and has discovered a process of ‘co-
evolution’ in which government can and should en-
courage developments in innovation by defining the 
‘rules of the game’, financial assistance, and the 
creation of new actors (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 
2000). 
Despite this awareness of the importance of po-
litical decisions and policies, these approaches do 
not explain under which circumstances and by what 
causal mechanisms ‘signals’ from knowledge and 
innovation will be taken up and translated into po-
litical reforms.  
Implicitly, both the national systems of innovation 
approach and the triple helix approach assume that 
there will be adaptation and congruence of political 
and innovation activities in the end, but they fail to 
explain how this happens. 
Our main concern in this special issue is to  
overcome lack of knowledge regarding the political 
process of responding to changing dynamics in the 
‘environment’, i.e. in knowledge and innovation sec-
tors (the ‘knowledge space’; see below). Systemic-
oriented knowledge and innovation policies need 
adequate structures and processes within the politi-
cal system, most notably the capacity to coordinate 
different political activities of governing of knowl-
edge and innovation.  
We want to know about possible hurdles within 
the political system to setting up a more encompass-
ing knowledge and innovation policy and under 
what circumstances and by what means we can ex-
pect they may be encountered. All case studies in 
this special issue take these questions as their start-
ing point.  
In the remainder of this introduction we intend to 
construct a heuristic model on the basis of a number 
of insightful studies that will help to guide the inter-
pretation of the different cases in the special issue. 
We start with a presentation of the dynamics of the 
‘knowledge space’ that, as the second step, induces 
reaction at the level of the political system by 
strengthening political coordination. 
Congruence of structures in the knowledge 
space 
The OECD Monit-project (OECD, 2005a), which 
dealt explicitly with the relationship between inno-
vation dynamics on the one hand and the quest for 
political coordination on the other, as well as the 
‘systems of innovation’ approach, generally start 
from the assumption that ‘third level innovation pol-
icy’ (OECD, 2005a) needs linking to a large variety 
of sectors and people in the innovation system. The 
‘centre’ of the innovation system, which we will  
label the knowledge space, is formed by those  
sectors that are directly involved in the production, 
diffusion, and application of knowledge. 
In order to develop a more analytical model we 
state that two dimensions structure the knowledge 
space: The first dimension defines the ‘rationale’, 
the meaning of the sector (Mayntz, 1988), which in 
our case is the production of knowledge, i.e. re-
search, on the one hand, and the transmission and 
diffusion of knowledge, i.e. education, on the other. 
The second dimension concerns the ‘motive of ac-
tion’: utilitarian-oriented or non-utilitarian-oriented. 
While non-utilitarian knowledge production is in-
spired by curiosity and the search for truth, the utili-
tarian motive leads to a quest for chances to apply 
fundamental knowledge and develop new technolo-
gies. Likewise, there is a difference between the 
higher education teacher transmitting scientific 
knowledge for general education and personality  
development purposes on one hand and, on the 
other, the vocational trainer and teacher who at-
tempts to improve the chances of students on the  
labour market. 
Figure 1 demonstrates that we can in this way  
distinguish between four knowledge-related sectors1 
(higher education, vocational training and profes-
sional education, basic research, and technological 
research and development) that have their own ori-
entation, traditions, cultures, (professional) roles, 
and institutionalisation. 
The differentiation into sectors can cause difficul-
ties for the exchange of ‘resources’ between sectors: 
vertically, the basic research sector needs the influx 
of young people for its research activities, while 
knowledge transmission in higher education depends 
on the creation of new knowledge by research. The 
interface between the higher education sector and 
the research sector is institutionalised in the form of 
universities and is also represented in the person of 
the university scientist who has two social roles: 
teacher and researcher. The vertical exchange rela-
tionship on the right side of the knowledge space is 
very similar: technological development profits from 
the influx of students educated in institutions of pro-
fessional education, and vocational training needs 
input not only from enterprises in the economic sec-
tor but also from researchers who bring in new tech-
nological knowledge. Polytechnics are most often 
the kind of institutions that handle this transfer. 
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While vertical transfer is rather unproblematic  
because it has been institutionalised in most  
countries for quite some time, this is not the case 
with horizontal exchange in the knowledge space. 
The transfer of higher education knowledge into the 
world of vocational training and vice versa has been 
tedious, and the transfer between fundamental re-
search and technological development, as well as be-
tween technological knowledge and fundamental 
research (Stokes, 1997), has for a long time not been 
a priority given the linear science-push conception 
of innovation (Guston and Keniston, 1994). The 
main problem is that globalisation, generic tech-
nologies, and new conceptions of innovation exer-
cise a continuing pressure on the institutionalisation 
of cooperation between the research sector and tech-
nological development. 
The new conceptions developed in the framework 
of the knowledge society demand an opening of uni-
versities to the world of professions and enterprises 
while professional education institutions are pushed 
more and more to develop a more sophisticated and 
creative knowledge that creates a stronger interest in 
linking to the higher education sector. In other 
words, the dynamics in the knowledge space linked 
to innovation and the development of the knowledge 
society demand a strengthening of ties between 
higher education and professional education and be-
tween research and technological development. New 
institutions are in demand along with the emergence 
of new professional roles. 
These are the points raised in the ‘third phase of 
innovation policy’: innovation today needs close in-
teraction between these sectors, and the political  
system has the task of promoting the creation of in-
terfaces and networks between the different sectors. 
But this can be done only if policy-makers adapt 
their goals and structures in such a way that the 
horizontal linkages in the knowledge space, above 
all, can be improved. If, however, the policy design 
is still inspired by the ‘old linear models of innova-
tion’ and if the ‘machinery of government’ is still 
based on the differentiation into four different policy 
fields,2 a reform of ‘goals’ and ‘structures’ at the 
level of governance in order to adapt are needed. In 
other words, if ‘networking’ and ‘interaction’ be-
come the main structuring principles in the knowl-
edge space, new ‘coordination’ efforts are needed at 
the governance level. 
What kind of political coordination is 
needed? 
Coordination is a very illustrious notion that needs 
specification. What do we mean, exactly, when we 
speak of the need for coordination with regard to po-
litical governance in general and the machinery of 
government in particular? What kind of coordination 
do we need to be effective in innovation policy? 
How much political coordination is needed? 
Though policy coordination is a recurring topic in 
administrative literature, we will search in vain for 
‘a systematic and useful approach to managing the 
coordination process’ (Metcalfe, 1994) or for an un-
ambiguous concept of coordination (Jordan and 
Schout, 2006). This is probably not so astonishing if 
we consider, as Boston does, that ‘coordinating  
Figure 1. The four sectors of the knowledge space 
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policies and administration is hard work, there is no 
easy recipe for success, nor a ready-made technol-
ogy for coordination’ (Boston, 1992: 100–101). 
There are, nevertheless, useful heuristics that  
can help to find answers to the above questions. 
Painter (1981), for example, presents an instrumen-
tal definition by enumerating five objectives for  
policy coordination: 
1. Avoidance, or at least minimization, of duplication 
and overlap. 
2. Avoidance of policy inconsistencies. 
3. Minimisation of conflict, both bureaucratic and 
political. 
4. Quest for coherence and cohesion and an agreed 
ordering of priorities. 
5. Promotion of a comprehensive or ‘whole govern-
ment’ perspective against the constant advocacy 
of narrow, particularistic or sectoral perspectives. 
Taking a closer look reveals two classes of objec-
tives that usually play a role in the political system 
when coordination is discussed. The first three ob-
jectives are related to the more general objective of 
an ‘efficient’ state by reducing the costs of bureau-
cratic action; the last two objectives refer to the co-
herence of decision-making, which is the main point 
of the OECD Monit-project, i.e. drawing separated 
forces together in order to pursue common priorities 
and strategies developed on a ‘systemic’ level (the 
‘whole-government’ perspective). 
Another way to approach coordination is to ask 
what needs to be done. Painter (1981) and later  
Peters (2005) have already proposed a dual heuristic: 
‘policy’ or ‘functional’ coordination is concerned 
with the development of a ‘clear, consistent and 
agreed set of policies, the determination of priorities 
and the formulation of strategies for putting these 
policies into practice’ (Boston, 1992: 89). In other 
words, it means coordination at the level of policy 
formulation. ‘Administrative coordination’ on the 
other hand, ‘concerns the problem of getting every-
one to pull in the same direction given agreement on 
what direction to go in’ (Painter, 1981: 274). This is 
the level of policy implementation, and it is at this 
level that ‘efficiency’ problems, as mentioned 
above, can occur. Policy coordination as such does 
not absolutely need a whole-government perspective, 
but it implies at a minimum a perspective that is 
agreed upon by a number of political actors. It is 
clear that an encompassing innovation policy, as the 
OECD demands, needs both policy and administra-
tive coordination. 
This highlights that two steps need to be taken in 
order to arrive at political coordination. First, a com-
mon strategy must be developed, which means that 
one enters the ‘political arena’ where parties have to 
bargain for policies. Second, the cooperation of ac-
tors in the ‘machinery of government’ is needed in 
order to put common strategies into action. This 
does not preclude policy formulation at the ministe-
rial level instead of at the cabinet level, though it 
will be difficult to develop a ‘whole-government’ 
perspective at this level. The cabinet level will usu-
ally have a fundamental role in policy coordination. 
In order to achieve administrative coordination 
one could make another well-known analytical dis-
tinction of negative coordination (Scharpf, 1973, 
2000), which means that actors — for example, two 
ministries — are not completely independent in their 
decision-making but obliged to take into account a 
negative backlash against their own actions by the 
other actor. Negative coordination avoids negative 
spill-over by information and often by formalised 
procedures in which other actors can react to the pol-
icy intentions of a ministry (e.g. the procedure of 
‘co-signing’ of law proposals; interdepartmental 
committees, etc.). Negative coordination is a non-
cooperative game that leads, as Scharpf (2000) em-
phasises, to the mutual adjustment of actors, but not 
to concerted action nor to cohesiveness of policies. 
Negative coordination cannot suffice for the inten-
tions of the ‘third phase of innovation policy’. 
‘Positive coordination’ goes, according to Peters 
(2006), one step further, as it implies more than  
mutual adjustment. Instead, actors start to cooperate 
with each other in order to deliver certain services. 
Such positive coordination can take place in inter-
departmental committees, with the help of coordina-
tion divisions of ministries, within jointly managed 
policy programmes, or by participating in the writ-
ing of a White Paper on a common subject. It typi-
cally develops at the ministerial or agency level. In 
order to succeed, a ‘win–win’ game is needed in 
which each partner in the cooperation can ameliorate 
his or her position by participation in the coopera-
tion. Such cooperation does not need a whole-
government perspective. It can be restricted to cer-
tain domains. In fact, it can be quite limited and last 
only for a certain period. This again does not yet ful-
fil the need for an encompassing innovation policy, 
but positive coordination is certainly necessary at the 
level of administrative coordination when overall 
agreed-upon strategies must be implemented. It is a 
necessary condition for effectiveness, but it is not 
yet a sufficient condition. 
Peters discusses still two other analytical levels of 
coordination that match the demands implicit in 
‘policy coordination’: ‘policy integration’ strives for 
 
What do we mean, exactly, when we 
speak of the need for coordination 
with regard to political governance in 
general and the machinery of 
government in particular? 
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the coordination of goals; ‘strategic coordination’ 
aims at the development of encompassing common 
visions and strategies for the future. This is at the 
same time the most far-reaching type of coordina-
tion. Policy integration and strategic coordination 
are adequate means for achieving an encompassing 
innovation policy. 
These different degrees of coordination can be or-
dered along the lines of a Guttman scale3 (see  
Figure 2). 
In sum, in order to achieve an encompassing  
innovation policy, an overall agreement on objec-
tives and strategic goals must be achieved. ‘Policy 
coordination’ is a sine qua non for this project. This 
does not mean that we can do without administrative 
coordination, which needs to be established at the 
level of implementation. There are two modes of co-
ordination here, negative and positive coordination. 
Negative coordination would not suffice for achiev-
ing an encompassing policy, as it often exists today. 
Positive coordination seems to be the right degree of 
coordination at the implementation level, i.e. coop-
eration in the delivery of services on the base of 
commonly agreed-upon policy goals. 
But the main question is, How can ‘policy coordi-
nation’ be achieved in the political system? By what 
means? How — and this is our main concern — 
must the ‘machinery of government’ be organised to 
allow for ‘policy coordination’? 
According to existing studies, a number of hurdles 
must be overcome if political coordination is to 
reach the level of ‘policy coordination’: the institu-
tional complexity of governance in knowledge  
sectors; cultural segmentation and standard interests 
at the level of ministries, agencies, and cabinet;  
and lack of strategic intelligence. We will attempt  
to highlight these points. We will first illustrate  
the complexity of institutional levels that play a role 
in the political system before discussing several  
institutional solutions in the light of the mentioned 
hurdles that play a role in this context. 
Institutional complexity 
On the basis of their comparative study on research 
and innovation governance in eight countries,  
Arnold and Boekholt (2003: 28) have distinguished 
four institutional levels that are relevant to innova-
tion policies. Their fourth level corresponds to the 
level of the ‘knowledge space’, which in our heuris-
tic model is on the same level as the political system. 
The three ‘political’ levels are the following:4 
1. The level of the government and the cabinet, i.e. 
the level of ‘high politics’, where major objectives 
as well as institutional reforms of the machinery 
of government are decided. 
2. The sectoral level of ministries, which is again 
subdivided into divisions and subdivisions; at this 
level, day-to-day decisions, decisions about im-
plementation, and implementation activities take 
place. 
3. The agency level, which, especially in research 
and technology policy, executes implementation 
tasks and often has — depending on its ‘constitu-
tion’ — a certain degree of operational autonomy, 
i.e. freedom to decide on how to implement  
policies. 
 
Federal countries need to cope with an additional 
challenge, i.e. how to define competences and au-
thority in the four sectors of the knowledge space 
between the federal and the regional level and how 
to cooperate. Education, for example, is more often 
than not the traditional prerogative of member states 
in federal countries, while the federal government 
often has the money to finance higher education  
 
Figure 2. A Guttman scale of political coordination
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institutions above all. This leads to demands for co-
ordination. Concerning the machinery of govern-
ment, the separation of powers may lead to lack of 
institutionalisation of certain policy sectors at the 
federal level if the member states dispose of the 
competences, or at least to a weak institutionalisa-
tion. We will see that this has been the case in both 
Germany and Switzerland.  
A federal structure therefore has two effects: it 
structures the machinery of the ‘federal’ government 
and it influences decision-making structures about 
reorganisation. Federal governments have some 
leeway to decide on their internal organisation, but 
they must take into account the sensibilities of 
member states. In this way, federalism is an impor-
tant additional horizontal level that is situated at the 
level of the cabinet, where major decisions about the 
policies and structures of the federal state are taking 
place5 (Figure 3). 
In addition to this differentiation into vertical in-
stitutional levels — the ‘hardware’ of governance — 
is the ‘software’, i.e. the governance modi that bind 
the different institutional levels of the machinery of 
government together. In the Weberian understanding 
of bureaucracy, one would expect that ‘hierarchy’ is 
the glue that binds all institutional levels together. 
This concept is seriously contested. Decisions at the 
cabinet level will rarely be the decision of the Prime 
Minister, though there are political systems that 
function in this way. More often, cabinets decide 
collectively or leave major decision-making powers 
to the individual ministers. At the ministerial or sec-
toral level, the authority of the ministry depends on a 
number of factors, such as, for example, the size and 
homogeneity of the ministry, the certainty or uncer-
tainty of outcomes to be expected from ministerial 
activities, the level of information, etc. Intermediary 
agencies, finally, are often quite detached from the 
direct influence of ministries. This is often expressed 
in the legal status of such agencies as ‘semi-public’ 
or private. 
From this it follows that one cannot expect that a 
decision at the level of the cabinet hierarchically 
flows from the ministerial down to the agency level. 
Bargaining is a much more frequent mode of inter-
action than hierarchy and will be found at all three 
institutional levels. We may find that bargaining 
takes place ‘under the shadow of hierarchy’ (Benz, 
2006), where the negotiating partners at the ministe-
rial level are obliged to arrive at an understanding 
because the cabinet expects them do so. But it may 
also comprise the simple bargaining between organi-
sations that have in principle the same ‘authority 
status’.  
The same holds for agencies that are dealing with 
each other. Another governance modus has been in-
troduced into new public management in particular, 
i.e. coordination by contract, especially between 
ministries and agencies. Contracts are often the re-
sult of bargaining but introduce a more binding 
character of negotiation results. 
There is no need to discuss such governance 
modes in detail here. The important message is that 
the complex arrangements at the level of the politi-
cal system become even more complicated because 
of different co-existing governance modes that often 
 
From this it follows that one cannot 
expect that a decision at the level of 
the cabinet hierarchically flows from 
the ministerial down to the agency 
level 
 
Figure 3. The institutional matrix of political governance 
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do not allow for quick and hierarchical decisions. 
Reforms of the machinery of government are the re-
sult of a complex interplay of various institutional 
levels that is based mostly on bargaining between 
actors. This does not allow for a straightforward  
policy of institutional reform and restricts the room 
for manoeuvring of the political will and skill of  
policy-makers. 
The ‘matrix structure’ of governance demon-
strates, moreover, one other important point: the 
various institutional levels are interconnected. A re-
form of ministries may have implications for the 
representation of policy sectors on the level of the 
cabinet, and it will have effects on the governance 
and organisations of agencies. In a similar way, one 
may expect changes in the machinery of government 
if the composition of the government changes, and 
some reorganisation on the ministerial level will be 
needed if there is restructuring at the agency level. If 
one speaks, as the OECD does, of the development 
of a ‘whole-government-perspective’ that is needed, 
this means not only horizontal coordination but also 
vertical coordination of the different institutional 
levels. Reforming the machinery of government is a 
matter of multi-level governance applied to the level 
of the state. 
Five institutional options for promoting  
policy coordination 
The institutional matrix reveals the complexity of 
finding institutional solutions to coordination. In what 
follows we will discuss possible institutional options 
for coordination enhancement (interdepartmental 
bargaining; superministries; agency coordination) 
and what is needed on the level of the cabinet to en-
gage in a strategy of policy coordination. 
External coordination 
On the ministerial level we can distinguish between 
two solutions for overcoming the ‘utilitarian divide’, 
i.e. ‘external coordination’ between ministries and 
‘internal coordination’ within one superministry. In 
order to achieve external coordination, one option 
would be to rely on ‘interdepartmental bargaining’. 
For example, one could group the often-used ‘co-
signature’ procedure,6 budget procedures that require 
some coordination, or the set-up of ‘interdepartmen-
tal committees’ under this header. The administra-
tive literature is extremely sceptical about 
reorganisation capacities by voluntary action of min-
istries. Two approaches explain this scepticism: 
Sociological institutionalism (March and Olsen, 
1984, 1989; Meyer and Scott, 1983) perceives minis-
tries as organisations with a long history and tradition. 
On the basis of such history and tradition, organisa-
tions usually develop their own organisational  
culture and worldviews. Any coordination between 
organisations must be built on this foundation of dif-
ferent organisational routines, worldviews, and inter-
ests, which makes it difficult to build something new 
that would in principle overcome existing routines 
and develop a different causal view of the world, as an 
encompassing policy should. It will not be easy to 
convince the ministry of education and the ministry of 
economy and technology to unite forces if their previ-
ous policies have been based on a ‘linear model of in-
novation’ that functioned as the very rationale for the 
separation of these functions into two ministries. Any 
reform from outside obliging these ministries to 
launch such a new kind of cooperation, sociological 
institutionalism states, will fail. Only reforms that 
emerge incrementally from within the organisation 
have a chance of overcoming existing routines. This 
scepticism is shared by the studies of the OECD 
(2005b,c) and Technopolis (Arnold and Boekholt, 
2003): Voluntary bargaining between ministries will 
be confined by existing routines and worldviews and 
any exogenous reform might fail because of implicit 
resistance of actors within ministries. 
Purposive actor models (Peters, 1992), in particular 
rational choice theory, underline ‘standard interests’ 
that all corporate actors, including ministries, must 
defend. By standard interests is meant the resources 
needed for action, the domain of interest to be de-
fended and expanded, and the degree of control over 
the domain of influence the actor needs as well as 
his or her autonomy in dealing with the domain of 
influence. Applying such a view leads us to the un-
derstanding that — as long as coordination cannot 
be imposed by hierarchy — positive coordination 
and ‘policy coordination’ can occur only if the stan-
dard interests of ministries are not in danger or if 
they can even be improved. Win–win games and 
‘Pareto-optimal’ pay-offs are required to launch 
such coordination. Some coordination may, for ex-
ample, correspond with objectives already devel-
oped in ministries, and some coordinated action may 
lead to a better situation for all participants than in-
dependent actions. In this view, the benefits of coor-
dination must be set in relation to the transaction 
costs and other costs involved in coordination  
procedures. 
It is not possible to determine the chances for co-
ordination in an abstract way, because benefits and 
costs depend on the context of decisions. But this 
view makes it clear that all coordination needs the 
willingness of ministries to cooperate, and willing-
ness depends on the ‘profit’ ministries can make by 
complying with coordination. Therefore, one cannot, 
under conditions of actors with equal powers, as-
sume that coordination will be established if this 
means disadvantages for the interests involved. This 
immediately demonstrates the limits of ‘interde-
partmental bargaining’ in the quest for ‘policy coor-
dination’: only Pareto-optimal solutions are feasible. 
Purposive actor models do, however, allow for 
change as long as standard interests are not violated. 
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Taking into consideration both ‘sociological in-
stitutionalism’ and ‘purposive actor models’, there 
seems to be only one way out and that is to make 
voluntary bargaining between ministries subject to 
the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Benz, 2006). If minis-
tries can be obliged to find a cooperative solution 
that opens up the way for ‘policy coordination’, 
‘Kaldor’ solutions may be acceptable, in which 
pay-offs create general welfare but where some 
players might lose in the distribution of values and 
resources (Scharpf, 1997). The obvious problem of 
the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ is that some consensus 
and coordination is already needed at another level, 
in this case the cabinet level, that is subject to its 
own restrictions. It is not a solution that can  
be found by actors on the ministerial level alone,  
as distributive interests are usually very strong, 
while it is possible at the cabinet level to establish 
a more ‘rational’ discussion of problem-solving 
(see below). 
Internal coordination 
Interdepartmental bargaining depends on the self-
interest of ministries, and coordination can occur 
only if benefits are higher than costs, there are no 
losers in the game, and the identity and organisa-
tional routines of each ministry are respected. Would 
it not then be better to overcome the distributive 
struggle that may undermine coordination efforts by 
simply dissolving corporate actors and/or creating 
new ones? Would it not be the easiest way to build 
one organisation, one ‘superministry’ responsible for 
the four policy sectors of the knowledge space? A 
large number of countries have embarked on this 
road without demonstrating convincing evidence so 
far that such a reorganisation is the best course of 
action (Arnold and Boekholt, 2003: 58). 
Superministries seem, at a first glance, to be the 
obvious solution for ‘policy coordination’. The four 
knowledge policy sectors can be united under one 
roof, and this means bringing them together under 
one leadership, one minister, who in principle has 
the authority to develop encompassing strategies 
and to oblige the divisions in ministries to comply 
with such plans. Costs and benefits are internalised 
within one organisation, which should lead to a re-
duction of negative externalities and hence more 
efficiency. Moreover, such a superministry would 
develop a ‘standard interest’ in pursuing cohesion 
of the knowledge space and link the different pol-
icy sectors if such a strategy were fixed from the 
outset in its ‘constitution’. Transaction costs usually 
involved in bringing different ministries together 
could be reduced considerably. It is this ‘idealised’ 
picture of a superministry that has seduced many 
governments to use the organisational form of a 
superministry. 
There are, however, a number of arguments that 
oppose such an idealised vision. These arguments 
can be briefly summarised as follows: 
• The creation of one superministry may not over-
come the need for internal coordination, as older 
administrative units may persist as subunits within 
the ministry, which would mean the maintenance 
of different cultures and worldviews. 
• Hierarchical guidance is a function of the size and 
the span of control of the ministry (Hammond, 
1990; Peters, 2001: 152; Arnold and Boekholt, 
2003: 37). If the ministry is very large and hetero-
geneous in its composition, it may be difficult to 
apply commands, as information deficits will oc-
cur. The more complex an organisation gets, the 
more difficult it becomes to use hierarchical pow-
ers (OECD, 1987; Peters, 1998: 297). In addition, 
if the subject matter of the organisation is very di-
verse and technically demanding, and if it is diffi-
cult to apply standardised procedures and 
routines, hierarchy may not be applicable. This, 
however, is the case in all four knowledge policy 
sectors (Arnold and Boekholt, 2003: 37). 
• Even if the responsible minister were able to de-
velop encompassing plans and instruct the organ-
isational units within the ministry about what and 
how to implement, the danger would still exist of 
‘creeping resistance’ by organisational units  
opposed to the new views and plans and reluctant 
to adapt. 
One argument, however, supports the creation of a 
new superministry. Peters has a very sceptical view 
of the value of organisational rearrangements and 
their effectiveness in the machinery of government 
(Peters, 1998: 17). According to him, it is not the 
choice of a specific organisational form that matters. 
More important is its symbolic value. The very fact 
that a superministry is created is important, because 
it indicates the willingness of the government to 
think differently about innovation policy and that it 
is prepared to give the knowledge space a high prior-
ity. New ministries can certainly also give a new 
élan to a policy sector or to the idea of coordination; 
new visions can be integrated into the ‘constitution’ 
of the ministry that determines the rationale of ac-
tion, because of the leadership of a new minister, 
who still has to earn his or her merits, and because 
new institutions are generally more flexible and more 
innovative before they start to develop routines. This 
may provide the impetus for a new philosophy of in-
novation policy. 
In other words, one should be cautious about em-
bracing the institutional solution of a superministry 
without giving up hope. The study of Denmark, in 
this special issue of Science and Public Policy, that 
introduced a superministry in 2002 will reveal 
whether the scepticism is justified. 
Coordination at the agency level 
Intermediary agencies have a different significance 
for the four knowledge space sectors we are consid-
ering. They play a minor role in education, but a 
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prominent role in both research and technological 
development. The establishment of such agencies in 
these policy sectors has a long tradition (Braun, 
1997). While ministries for research and technology 
— or organisational subunits in ministries — have 
therefore often mediated access only to the policy 
field, it is different in the case of the education min-
ister, for both higher and professional education. The 
vertical complexity of the policy sectors is therefore 
different. 
The question of ‘homology’ or congruent struc-
tures plays a similar role on the agency level as on 
the sectoral level. In many countries the logic of the 
linear model of innovation has also been applied at 
the agency level with separate agencies for basic re-
search on the one hand and technological research 
on the other. These agencies are usually attached to 
the ministry responsible for the sector in question. 
According to the OECD there seems to be a trend 
towards delegating more tasks to such agencies in 
the hope that coordination would be easier at this 
level and more effective because of the proximity to 
the operating level in the sector. There are reasons to 
be doubtful about these assumptions: 
• Intermediary agencies, which means in most cases 
funding agencies, very often have a legal status 
that puts them at some distance from political in-
fluence. They are seldom part of the public  
bureaucracy but have a ‘quasi-public’ or private 
status. Hierarchical orders by the responsible min-
ister are therefore excluded, with a few excep-
tions, but this does not mean that the minister 
would be without influence. It is above all the 
‘power of the purse’ that gives the minister access 
during budget negotiations. This can simply be by 
offering earmarked money for certain purposes or 
by concluding contracts with agencies. It is not in-
frequent, moreover, to see in the UK, Scandina-
via, and the Netherlands, for example, that the 
government has the right to dissolve and (re-) 
establish agencies. If such a potential threat exists, 
the influence of the government over structures 
and policies of agencies grows. 
• Intermediary agencies are often more closely 
linked to their clientele at the operative level than 
ministries (Braun, 1993; Braun and Guston, 2003) 
because they are in constant contact with their  
clientele, and because the clientele comprise part 
of the organisational structure of such agencies 
(Braun, 1998). These strong connections contrib-
ute to strong vertical relationships and the devel-
opment of similar worldviews with clients in the 
various sectors. In this way, both basic research 
and technologically oriented agencies are well  
anchored in their respective networks, which 
makes cooperation across sectors as difficult as on 
the ministerial level, if not more difficult. At the 
ministerial level, there is still the possibility of 
‘command’, even if internal resistance occurs; at 
the agency level such a command is usually not 
possible. In addition, intermediary agencies are 
mono-organisations, i.e. they are focusing on one 
sector only, while ministries often entail more 
than one sector, which contributes to a fragmenta-
tion of powers and objectives as well as loyalties 
inside the organisation. Organisational identities 
will therefore be even stronger at the agency level 
than at the ministerial level with ensuing difficul-
ties in overcoming ‘sectoral thinking’. This ex-
plains why evidence so far of attempts to create 
‘umbrella organisations’ with several research 
councils under one roof or by creating new agen-
cies is not met with much optimism about the ca-
pacity for reform at the agency level (Arnold and 
Boekholt, 2003: 39). 
Leadership at the cabinet level 
In order to be successful, both interdepartmental 
bargaining and superministries depend, as shown 
above, on decisions at the cabinet level. ‘Policy co-
ordination’ needs an encompassing policy view at 
the cabinet level as a necessary condition. But who 
decides and when about new policy strategies and a 
reorganisation of the machinery of government? 
The literature on the machinery of government 
(Davis et al, 1999) confirms that reorganisations of 
ministries and agencies are decided on the level of 
the cabinet, which in the Anglo-Saxon system means 
that the prime minister is the decisive policy-maker 
in launching such reorganisations. As the OECD 
discussed some time ago (OECD, 1987), however, 
the hierarchical system at the level of the cabinet is 
only one possible structure of decision-making. In 
addition we find the collective system, where cabinet 
decisions are made by deliberation among ministers, 
and the autonomous system, in which individual 
ministers are practically free to decide on their own 
policies. Both types of system make it much more 
difficult to come to a consensus on innovation pol-
icy, because as similar problems of ‘voluntary bar-
gaining’ exist as they do on the ministerial level, but 
this time with no ‘shadow of hierarchy’ as there is 
no higher level of decision-making. 
Even if we deal with a more hierarchical cabinet 
system with a strong leader, can we be sure that this 
is the obvious solution? The leader can, of course, 
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decide on major reorganisations of the machinery of 
government. She can create a superministry or inte-
grate some policy sectors into another ministry. She 
can oblige ministers to talk to each other and de-
velop a common strategy (‘bargaining in the shadow 
of hierarchy’). The leader has the authority to intro-
duce new procedures of cooperation, to use commit-
tees in order to create benchmarks to achieve, and to 
create monitoring and evaluation institutions that 
can control compliance to coordination. However, 
one should be aware that all these measures would 
change only the institutional structure and that their 
influence on ‘administrative coordination’, on the 
cooperation of ministries and agencies in the imple-
mentation process, could still remain weak. This is 
the typical hierarchy problem we mentioned before 
that has led Peters to the conviction that hierarchy as 
a governance mode seldom suffices but needs to be 
complemented by bargaining between actors: cabinet 
decisions remain exogenous to policies in sectors if 
the ministers have not been part of decision-making; 
even if the ministers have had a voice, this does not 
guarantee that administrators will indeed obey. Im-
plicit resistance may counteract such reforms. 
One needs to understand moreover what can mo-
tivate political leaders to launch such fundamental 
reorganisations of the machinery of government. In 
a comparative analysis of the reasons for reforms in 
the machinery of government, Pollitt (1984) reveals 
a variety of motives that may lead prime ministers to 
reform: ‘cabinet comfort’, ‘marking a change in em-
phasis’, or ‘creating an impression of reform’ are 
examples of frequent motives. Less often we find 
preoccupation with effective governance, the ‘func-
tionality of policies’ that react to changes in the en-
vironment and which must be the motivation it 
needs in order to launch a reform in innovation pol-
icy. When do leaders decide to react to changes in 
the environment? 
In order to answer this question it is useful to refer 
to the policy change model of Braun and Gilardi 
(2006): policy-makers are above all influenced in 
their decisions by vote- and office-seeking. This 
means that if a topic is promising in terms of elec-
toral gains or may be advantageous for gaining or 
maintaining office, it will have a chance to appear 
on the agenda of the leader. But there is more: the 
change of a policy, the introduction of a new policy 
innovation model, for example, depends on a com-
parison of the effectiveness of the existing policy in-
novation model and the availability of an alternative 
causal model that has a reasonable chance to be im-
plemented. Only if both conditions are fulfilled and 
the topic has ‘electoral appeal’ will we see actions 
by the prime minister. The presence of an alternative 
model depends on the system of ‘strategic intelli-
gence’ (see below). 
These thoughts indicate that no decision at the 
cabinet level can occur without having the ‘political 
business cycle’ in mind. An encompassing innova-
tion policy may be on the minds of leaders if it has 
been mediated by the logic of the political business 
cycle, i.e. if it pays in terms of office and votes. 
Then leaders can react, if they have the power to do 
so. In the ‘collective system’ and in the ‘autonomous 
system’ the consent of a large number of actors is 
also needed. 
Strategic intelligence 
The discussion so far has highlighted the extent to 
which the creation of congruent structures at the po-
litical level depends on the ‘logic of political power’. 
The role of ‘ideas’ or ‘puzzling’ (Heclo, 1974) can, 
however, have an important influence on the reor-
ganisation of the machinery of government. The  
dimension of ‘ideas’ is discussed in the OECD  
report under the title ‘strategic intelligence’ and re-
fers to advisory bodies, foresight, and evaluation 
procedures in government. 
Ideas certainly do not matter if decisions about 
reorganisation depend purely on ‘cabinet comfort’ 
or, in other words, on the political arithmetic of coa-
lition-making. Ideas are often degraded to symbolic 
use in public discourse. If, however, problem-
solving is taken seriously, if indeed the motive of 
reorganisation is the ‘functionality of policies’, ideas 
and with them ‘strategic intelligence’ have a chance 
to enter the political arena. 
Scientific analysis of problems can help to detect 
flaws in existing and applied policy models and, 
above all, offer alternatives. Without such scientific 
and evidence-based reasoning, it would become 
more difficult to overcome existing policy models 
and their institutional structures. Scientists can  
also have an important transfer function in taking up 
and explaining dynamics at the operative level to 
policy-makers. 
The most important function in this respect is the 
rationalisation of political debates. If it becomes 
possible to introduce convincing scientific argu-
ments into the political debate, this may reduce the 
influence of ‘distributive arguments’ that prevail in 
the political business cycle in favour of problem-
solving arguments. In order to do so, a forum is 
needed that allows scientific arguments to be heard. 
Pure scientific advisory bodies have the disadvan-
tage that they are often too detached from direct dis-
cussion with policy-makers. This reduces their effect 
on consensus building. A more promising option has 
been presented in Finland and in Japan, where scien-
tists are included in a top-level advisory body in 
which policy-makers and stakeholders participate 
and that is chaired by the prime minister (see the 
case study on Finland in this issue of Science and 
Public Policy). The direct contact can be helpful for 
rationalising political discussion. 
In several countries, above all in Scandinavia, we 
also find advisory bodies located at the ministerial 
level and conceived to advise a particular ministry 
(Peters, 2005). The existence of advisory bodies at 
this level can be helpful if administrators from other 
Introduction 
Science and Public Policy May 2008  237
ministries also take part in the discussions. Only 
then can one expect that the subject of cooperation 
will appear on the agenda. If this is not the case, 
even such advisory bodies will remain within the 
logic of the policy sector in question. 
Not only is it important that the cabinet level be-
come involved in launching ‘policy coordination’ in 
innovation policy, but convincing arguments and al-
ternative models as well as the willingness of leaders 
to engage in reforms of the functionality of policies 
are also needed. 
Overview of this special issue of  
Science and Public Policy 
The case studies of Finland, Denmark, Germany, 
and Switzerland in this special issue start from this 
conceptual framework and the questions put forth 
above. They attempt, first, to assess the specific  
institutional constellations and their capacity for 
overcoming existing fragmentation of knowledge 
and innovation policy at the level of the political 
system. This is a question not only of organising in-
novation-relevant policy areas by restructuring the 
composition of ministries, though this is an essential 
component (the horizontal dimension of coordina-
tion), but also of achieving ‘vertical coordination’. 
The machinery of government dealing with knowl-
edge sectors has a complex matrix structure that 
needs to be taken into account when assessing coor-
dination capacities of countries’ innovation policies. 
In sum, we want to know how problems, opportu-
nities, and solutions differ depending on different 
ways of institutionalising knowledge and innovation 
policies at the political level. Is it better, at the  
horizontal level, to use a superministry to improve 
coordination between knowledge policy sectors, or 
should we trust several ministries and, instead, im-
prove external coordination mechanisms? If so, in 
what ways? What levels of authority are decisive in 
setting up vertical and horizontal coordination? 
Which institutions can foster the cohesion of innova-
tion policies in general? These are the kind of ques-
tions all case studies are asking. 
We do not pretend to give final answers to these 
questions. Instead we focus on a number of exemplary 
cases that might illustrate the variety of institutional 
options chosen, the pitfalls involved, and the range 
of solutions adopted. 
We have chosen four countries with diverse insti-
tutional characteristics but also with sufficient simi-
larities to be able to hold a number of variables 
constant that we are not interested in (such as the 
degree of economic development, transition countries 
vs. long-established democratic countries, etc.). This 
is why we have chosen only European countries. In 
regard to the institutional differences among these 
four countries, we have first selected countries with 
the most difficult institutional constellation in terms 
of fragmentation, i.e. federal countries that at the 
same time have designed at least two ministries to 
deal with the knowledge space (Germany, Switzer-
land). On the other hand, we have the Scandinavian 
unitary countries. Denmark and Finland differ in 
terms of fragmentation at the level of ministries: 
Denmark has introduced a ‘superministry’ dealing 
with all aspects of the knowledge space, while 
Finland has been working for quite some time with 
two ministries and a highly influential Science and 
Technology Council. 
Finland is, of course, also usually regarded as a 
country with ‘best practices’ in innovation policy, 
which draws particular attention to the conducive-
ness of its institutional set-up. Denmark can offer 
important insights not only into how a ‘superminis-
try’ is able to overcome institutional fragmentation 
but also into the rationality of ‘internal coordination’ 
as the best device for an encompassing innovation 
policy. Germany has a changing history of placing 
various knowledge policy areas into one or two min-
istries. This should also give important information 
about the changing influence this has had on coordi-
nation capacities. In terms of innovative capacities, 
Switzerland is a very successful country, but it 
works with a seemingly very awkward institutional 
structure, i.e. two ministries, a federal constellation, 
and an impotent high-level advisory council. 
In sum, this special issue of Science and Public 
Policy is intended to give insights into the capacity 
of policy-makers to design cohesive and coherent 
policy by way of coordinating their machinery of 
government in knowledge and innovation policy. 
This can serve as a basis for further research that 
should take into account the lessons drawn from 
these case studies and use them in the context of a 
larger comparison of OECD countries. 
Notes 
1. We will consider only tertiary education here, though one could 
of course include primary and secondary education. 
2. Which usually means that higher education and science and 
research policies are in one ministry, and professional educa-
tion and technology policy in another. In contrast to this  
‘vertical segmentation’ we may find a ‘horizontal segmentation’ 
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(a research and technology ministry and an education ministry 
comprising higher and professional education). Other ‘combi-
nations’ are, of course, possible but less frequent than this  
all-vertical segmentation. Integration, i.e. all four policy sectors 
integrated into one ministry, is the third alternative, which, at 
least at first sight, seems to reflect the congruent structure that 
would be needed to correspond to the innovation dynamics. 
Denmark, France, Spain, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and Italy 
would be examples. As we will demonstrate, ‘integration’ at the 
level of ministries is, however, not yet a guarantee of success-
ful coordination, and other coordination mechanisms may form 
viable alternatives. 
3. Metcalfe developed a similar Guttman-scale on the base of 
‘management capacities’ that coordination requires. ‘Establish-
ing central priorities’, his second-highest coordination level, 
corresponds to our policy integration, and ‘government strat-
egy’ to the highest level of ‘strategic coordination’ (Metcalfe, 
1994). 
4. Arnold and Boekholt (2003) do not mention the supra- and the 
international levels. Most European countries are bound into 
the European Union, which becomes more and more a player 
in research and technology and also in education policy. Inter-
national treaties and cross-border networks between countries 
also increasingly influence what is decided in a country, and 
they may have an impact on the governance structures of 
countries. One can, for example, imagine the creation of coor-
dination divisions within ministries that take care of jointly fi-
nanced programs at the level of the EU or that deal simply with 
the coordination of policies between the EU and the country in 
question. The main influence, however, will be at the level of 
strategy development and funding decisions. We do not ex-
pect a major impact on institutionalisation policies concerning 
the knowledge space in one country, though. 
5. ‘The problems of managing horizontally are compounded 
when the issue of coordination among levels of government is 
added, especially in federal regimes such as Canada … The 
fundamental root of the coordination problem in federal sys-
tems is that most federal regimes have evolved in ways that 
permit all levels of government to be involved in almost all pol-
icy areas.’ (Peters, 2005: 5–6) 
6. A procedure that demands that ministries distribute law  
proposals to other ministries before they are treated in gov-
ernment and parliament and that other ministries can signal 
their approval or disapproval according to how this proposal 
affects their own working. The ministry in question is supposed 
to take negative remarks into account and modify its proposal 
accordingly. 
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